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Abstract 
It has been shown that in decision making evaluations of evidence and attributes are modified. 
In three studies it was investigated if this finding of coherence shifts generalizes to real-world 
probabilistic inference decisions which are made from given probabilistic cues. Using a 
within-subjects design, cue validities were measured before, after (Exp. 1) and during deci-
sion making (Exp. 2 & 3). It was found that even in environments with considerable real-
world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in decisions for which the application of fast-
and-frugal heuristics has been claimed (city-size decisions) the validity of cues was system-
atically modified. These shifts indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, 
but that they are changed to form coherent representations of the decision situation. The find-
ings conflict with the basic assumption of complex decision models and the fast-and-frugal 
heuristics approach, which claim that probabilistic inferences are made in a unidirectional 
manner. They corroborate the parallel constraint satisfaction approach to decision making.  
Keywords:  Decision Making, Connectionism, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction, Fast-and-
Frugal Heuristics, Bounded Rationality 
PsychInfo Classification Code: (2340) Cognitive Processes 
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The only thing we know for sure is that the future is uncertain. This is not to say that chaos 
rules the world. Some things are quite stable over years and sometimes ages. There are good 
reasons to assume that ten years from now the sun will rise in the east and a bottle of Coke 
will contain a beverage that actually tastes like Coke. Conversely, it is hard to forecast next 
autumn’s weather and the quality of a future vintage of German Riesling. In order to cope 
with uncertainty, organisms can capitalize on probabilistic relations between cues and future 
events (i.e., between predictors and criteria). In repetitive situations, these relations can be 
learned by experience. When making a decision, individuals can rely on probabilistic infer-
ences to predict a criterion (e.g., a consequence of a behavior) from the presence of a predic-
tor (e.g., a discriminative stimulus). In line with the Brunswikian approach to probabilistic 
inferences (Brunswik, 1955), the predictor variables are referred to as cues that differ in valid-
ity (i.e., the conditional probability that options with a positive cue value are better on the cri-
terion than options with a negative cue value).  
Natural environments provide multiple cues for inference. How do people deal with this com-
plexity? Inspired by Herbert Simon's notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1982), 
judgment and decision researchers commonly assume that individuals employ a couple of 
heuristics that reduce complex tasks to simpler ones (see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982, for overviews). A considerable amount of work 
on probabilistic inferences stems from Gigerenzer and his research group (Gigerenzer, Hof-
frage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999); they de-
scribed a couple of fast-and-frugal heuristics in a very precise manner.  
Perhaps the best-known example is the Take the Best (TTB) heuristic. It comprises three 
steps. First, it selects the cue with the highest validity and looks up the cue values of the alter-
natives. Second, if one alternative has a higher value than the others, the search for informa-
tion is stopped (otherwise one goes back to Step 1 and tries the second best cue). The third 
step contains the decision rule: Predict or choose the winning alternative that is the one with 
the highest value. Assume for example, that you wish to go to a sunny place to spend your 
holidays. There are two alternatives on your list, region A and region B. You consult a 
weather forecast to predict the criterion (weather). News channels, newspapers, federal and 
commercial agencies provide a huge set of cues to choose from. Nevertheless, employing 
TTB makes the task very easy. You simply look up the prediction from the source you subjec-
tively consider as most reliable (e.g., the forecast from the biggest news channel in your coun-
try). If the cue (the forecast from this channel) discriminates between the two regions, you 
base your decision on this one piece of information. You choose, for example, to go to region 
B if the weather forecaster predicts sunshine for B and rain for A.  
The TTB heuristic perfectly mirrors the basic assumptions of the fast-and-frugal heuristics 
approach: One-reason decision making, unidirectional reasoning, and invariance of cue valid-
ities. Heuristics cope with complexity by ignoring information. In accordance with the princi-
ple take the best ignore the rest (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999, p. 81), it is proposed that 3 
many, if not most, of our decisions and judgments are based on one reason. Interestingly, de-
cisions relying on partial processing of information can yield quite accurate results compared 
to normative standards as evidenced by computer simulations and experimental studies (e.g., 
Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). 
According to the second assumption, fast-and-frugal heuristics work always in one direction. 
They start from given cues and infer the criterion. Of course, the hierarchy of cue validities 
can be changed through learning. Nevertheless, cue validities are conceived as given during a 
particular task. As such, they provide the hard constraints under which inference processes 
evolve. The same principle of unidirectional reasoning from the cues to the criterion underlies 
most complex decision models such as the normative standards provided by Bayesian reason-
ing, weighted additive rules for cue integration (WADD; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et al., 
1988; cf. Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007) and evidence accumulation models (Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993). According to the WADD rule, individuals compute a weighted sum of cue 
values and cue validities for all available options and choose the option with the highest 
weighted sum. Unidirectional reasoning also dovetails with the utility theory's axiom of pref-
erence invariance. Specifically, utility theory assumes that the weights of attribute dimensions 
are fixed during a decision task (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  
The selection of decision strategies in probabilistic inferences has been tested by investigating 
choices and information search. The findings often conflict with the assumption that heuris-
tics (e.g., TTB, equal weight rules) are the dominantly employed decision strategies even in 
environments in which the application of these rules would be predicted by the model (e.g., 
Bröder, 2000; Glöckner, 2006, 2007a; Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003; for a different inter-
pretation of the results, see Gigerenzer, 2004). In fact, WADD rules seem to be the default 
strategy (Bröder, 2003; Glöckner & Betsch, in press). However, in support of the fast-and-
frugal heuristics approach Rieskamp and Otto (2006) have shown that individuals could learn 
to apply simple heuristics from repeated feedback. In the current work we investigate decision 
strategies on a more general level by measuring the stability of subjective cue validities in the 
decision process. 
The notion of unidirectional reasoning and invariance of cue validities is, to the best of our 
knowledge, shared by almost all complex decision models as well as all fast-and-frugal heu-
ristics that have been considered in the recent literature on probabilistic inferences (but see, 
Pennington & Hastie, 1992). This assumption is tackled by findings from research on multi-
attribute decision making and legal decision making. Simon, Krawczyk and Holyoak (2004) 
measured the subjective importance of outcome dimensions before, during and after choices 
were made. Specifically, they presented participants with job offers differing on four dimen-
sions: commute, office size, vacation and salary. The authors provide convincing evidence for 
coherence shifts showing that subjective weights of the outcome dimensions change in the 
course of the decision process (see also Simon et al., in press). Similar changes were found for 
the evaluations of arguments in decisions about complex criminal cases (Glöckner, 2007b; 4 
Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Pham et al., 2001; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004; Simon, 
2004). These findings are also in line with other evidence for systematic attribute and cue dis-
tortions before and after decisions (Brownstein, Read, & Simon, 2004; Carlson & Russo, 
2001; Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998; for an overview see Brownstein, 2003) which operate 
towards increasing consistency and decreasing dissonance.  
The results concerning coherence shifts further validate a constructivist view on decision 
making (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Montgomery, 1989; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1992; see also Slovic, 1995). Specifically, they support the connection-
ist approach to judgment and choice (Betsch, 2005; Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997; Thagard & Millgram, 1995). 
Accordingly, decision making is conceived as a holistic process characterized by an auto-
matic, parallel consideration of multiple pieces of information which are integrated based on 
consistency-maximizing processes (see below). The aim of the present research was to test 
whether coherence shifts obtained in multi-attribute outcome-based decisions and complex 
legal cases generalize to simple decisions based on probabilistic inferences in different do-
mains. 
In particular, we investigated the stability of cue validities during (a) decision tasks on choos-
ing a holiday region upon inspection of well known weather forecasts and (b) on selecting the 
larger city based on different cues (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). From a Parallel Constraint 
Satisfaction (PCS) approach (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008) we derive the assumption that even 
in simple probabilistic inference tasks, cue validities are changed to form a coherent represen-
tation of the decision. We aim to extend the perspective that consistency-maximizing proc-
esses are limited to complex decisions in which it is possible to construct stories (Pennington 
& Hastie, 1992; cf. Simon, 2004). The null hypothesis, derived from the above mentioned 
complex decision models and the fast-and-frugal heuristics approach, is that cue validities 
remain stable during the task. First, we provide a sketch of the connectionist PCS rule. Then 
computer simulations of the model are reported in which the predictions of coherence shifts in 
probabilistic inference decisions (and further predictions) are mathematically derived and 
their stability is investigated. Finally, three laboratory experiments are reported that test the 
hypothesis of coherence shifts. 
A PCS Approach to Probabilistic Inferences 
The model described below builds on a number of different approaches to decision making. 
Similar to dominance structuring models (e.g., Montgomery, 1989; Svenson, 1992), it draws 
on the assumption that (re)structuring of information is an integral part of the decision proc-
ess. PCS is based on principles of perception (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Read & 
Miller, 1998), which have been emphasized as an important framework for future research in 
judgment and decision making (Maule, 2005). Therefore it is a plausible mechanism from an 5 
evolutionary perspective (cf. Gilbert, 1991), which might account for the automatic processes 
in decision making that have been highlighted by several authors (Dougherty, Gettys, & 
Ogden, 1999; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Montgomery, 1989; 
Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004; Thagard & Millgram, 1995; Weber, Goldstein, & Bar-
las, 1995).  
Our PCS approach postulates that consistency maximizing processes, which can be simulated 
by connectionist networks, are the core operating processes of decision making (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008; cf. Simon, 2004). We argue that individuals use these Gestalt-like processes to 
form consistent interpretations of the task. Dependent on the structure of the task, advantages 
of one or the other interpretation (i.e., option) are automatically accentuated and enter aware-
ness. The resulting (more or less conscious) mental representations are the basis for decisions. 
The option with the highest activation within this mental representation is chosen. In the case 
that the mental representation does not reach an aspired level of consistency, deliberate proc-
esses set in to support consistency maximizing in the network. In the following, for simplic-
ity, we will focus only on the part of the model which describes the automatic consistency 
maximizing processes (i.e., the primary network; cf. Glöckner & Betsch, 2008) which is also 
described in length in Glöckner (2006, 2007).  
In order to model simple probabilistic inference tasks, we adopted the general connectionist 
approach proposed for preferential and complex legal decision making. Thereby, the degrees 
of freedom in the model were reduced by specifying the structure of the network. As depicted 
in Figure 1, the first set of units represents options, the second set represents cues, and a spe-
cial unit represents the general concept of validity of information. The links between options 
and cues reflect cue information (e.g., that cues speak for or against options). The links be-
tween validity of the information and cues reflect the initial subjective value of cue validities. 
Using a parallel constraint satisfaction algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Read, 
Vanman, & Miller, 1997), activations of the nodes are changed to reach a consistent solution 
(activation pattern) that satisfies the constraints in the system (fixed links and weights).
1 The 
final activation of the option nodes indicates the valence of the options, whereas the final ac-
tivation of the cue nodes represents posterior subjective cue validities. The number of itera-
                                        
1  The iterative updating algorithm uses a sigmoid activation function proposed by McClelland and Rumel-
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 ai(t) represents the activation of the node i at iteration t. The parameters floor and ceiling stand for the 
minimum and maximum possible activation (in our model set to a constant value of -1 and +1). Inputi(t) 
is the activation node i receives at iteration t, which is computed by summing up all products of activa-
tions and connection weights wij for node i. Decay is a constant decay parameter. 
 6 
tions of the relaxation algorithm to form the coherent pattern of activations can be used as an 





Figure 1. The general model for probabilistic inferences is depicted. Boxes represent nodes; 
lines represent links, which are all bi-directional. Connection weights can range from -1 to +1 
and are labeled w. Using the iterative updating algorithm coherence is produced in the network 
by changing activations a. The special node general validity has a constant activation of +1 




Simulations were computed on probabilistic inferences between two options based on three 
cues which differ in their validity. Specifically, we conducted a simulation of one critical de-
cision task in which the most valid cue makes an opposite prediction to the two lower cues. 
The simulated decision task appears in the left upper corner of Figure 2a. The simulation was 
based on the network model presented in Figure 1 and the iterative updating algorithm de-
scribed in Footnote 1. The initial validity of the most valid cue wv1 was manipulated. Choice 
                                        
2   The proposed PCS model shares some structural similarities with recent formulation of decision field 
theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004) and other evidence accumulation 
models (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 2004). Due to the assumption of unidirectional connections, how-
ever, these theories would not predict changes in subjective cue validities. 
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predictions (i.e., choices for option 1), changes of the subjective cue validity of cue 2 (i.e., aC2 
the activation of cue 2), and the prediction for the decision time (i.e., the number of iterations 
to find a stable solution) were recorded as dependent variables. 
Fixed parameters. PCS models have been simulated using different sets of parameters and it 
has been argued that findings are robust against changes of these (Thagard, 1989). We se-
lected parameters roughly oriented on the initial work by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981).
3  
The links between cues and options stand for the cue values (i.e., the cues’ information about 
the options). Positive cue values are represented by excitatory links of w = 0.01, negative cue 
values are represented by inhibitory links of the same strength, w = -0.01. Thus, the critical 
decision task was represented by: wc1-o1 = wc2-o2 = wc3-o2 = 0.01 and wc1-o2 = wc2-o1 = wc3-o1 = -0.01. 
The fact that only one option can be chosen was implemented by a strong negative link be-
tween the option nodes, wo1-o2 = -0.50. The decay parameter was set to 0.05. The stability cri-
terion used for terminating the process was 10 cycles with no energy changes bigger than 10
-6. 
Choices for option 1 are computed by comparing ao1 and ao2. 
Manipulation. The initial validity of cue 1 was systematically manipulated in 60 steps by 
changing the initial cue validity parameter of cue 1 wv1 from 0.40 to 1.00. Specific numeric 
constellations can lead to unsystematic variation in termination of the PCS mechanism. To 
reduce these effects and to produce more stable results, for each level of cue 1 the initial cue 
validities for cues 2 and 3 were additionally manipulated for each level of wv1 in a limited in-
terval. Specifically, for each wv1 the weight of the second cue wv2 was varied from 0.30 to 0.34 
and the weight of cue 3 wv3 was varied from 0.10 to 0.14. These variations were fully crossed 
resulting in 25 data points for each level of wv1 which were aggregated into one value. Finally, 
to smoothen the curve data points were aggregated for each 5 consecutive levels of wv1. Thus, 
each data point represents the average of 125 simulation results.  
Results and Interpretation 
The results of the simulation for the critical decision task with different initial validities of cue 
1 (x-axis) are depicted in Figures 2a to 2c. The graph of Figure 2a shows the proportion of 
choices for option 1. Option 1 choices are predicted if the final activation of option 1 is higher 
than the final activation of option 2. The graph shows an inflection point around which 
choices switch from option 2 to option 1. Conceptually, this can be interpreted as the point at 
which the validity of the highest cue is about equal to the validity of the concurring lower 
cues considering the constraints in the system. Parallel to the changes of choice proportion the 
posterior subjective validity of the second cue (i.e., activation of cue 2) is decreasing (Figure 
                                        
3   McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) used link weights between 0.005 (weak) and 0.30 (strong). The decay 
was 0.08. 8 
2b). The inflection point of the choice function falls together with the maximum of decision 
times (i.e., number of iterations t to find a stable state; Figure 2c).  
The reverse pattern – namely a decrease in the posterior subjective validity of the first cue – 
can be observed using a systematic variation of the initial cue validity of cue 2. More gener-
ally, from the PCS rule the specific hypothesis can be derived that cue validities are changed 
within the decision process according to the success of their predictions in the constraint satis-
faction process (i.e., if the cue speaks for or against the winning option, Simon, 2004). This 
PCS rule thereby predicts that these changes are inherent in the structuring process that drives 
the decision and are not confined to post-decisional processes (cf. Festinger, 1964). As dis-
cussed above, the prediction of changing cue validities stands in clear contrast to the predic-
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Figure 2a. Choice predictions from a simulation of the proposed connectionist model are de-
picted. The simulated decision situation appears in the left upper corner. Each data point 
represents the average of 125 simulation results. The fixed parameters of the simulation were 
wc1-o1 = wc2-o2 = wc3-o2 = +0.01, wc1-o2 = wc2-o1 = wc3-o1 = -0.01 and wo1-o2 = -0.50. The initial validity pa-
rameter of cue 1 wv1was manipulated from 0.40 to 1.00 as denoted on the x-axis. For each level 
of cue 1 wv2 was varied from 0.10 to 0.14 and wv3 was varied from 0.30 to 0.34 resulting in 25 
crossed constellations. The decay parameter was set to 0.05. The stability criterion used for 
terminating the process was 10 cycles with no energy changes bigger than 10
-6. Choices for 
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Figure 2b. The graph shows the result of the simulation in Figure 2a concerning the changes in 
cue validity of cue 2. On the x-axis the variation of the initial validity of cue 1 is shown, on the 







































Initial Validity Score Cue 1   
Figure 2c. The graph shows the result of the simulation in Figure 2a concerning the number of 
iterations of the PCS algorithm to find a stable solution which can be used as a predictor for 
decision times. On the x-axis the variation of the initial validity of cue 1 is shown, on the y-axis 
the number of iteration to find a stable solution is shown.  10 
Tests for Robustness 
Manipulation. Although we aimed to select parameters which are commonly used in simula-
tions of parallel constraint satisfaction models, it is important to show that the results also 
hold for other sets of parameters. Eight further simulations were run to substantiate the re-
sults. (To make comparisons easier, the parameters used in the basic simulation reported 
above are marked by ‘*’.) First, we tested robustness against variations of the decay parame-
ter (D) by using levels of 0.01, 0.05
* and 0.10. Second, we varied the stability parameter (St) 
at three levels 10
-3, 10
-6* and 10
-8. Third, we changed the weight of the negative connection 
between the option nodes O1 and O2 (O_w) to be -0.40, -0.50
* and -0.60. Finally, we tested 
robustness against different levels of weights for links between cues and options by setting all 
excitatory and inhibitory link weights (C_w) to 0.01/-0.01
*, 0.02/-0.02 and 0.10/-0.10.  
Results and Interpretation. In all simulations it was observed that the essential findings con-
cerning choices and changes in posterior cue validities remained robust against all variations 
of parameters (Figures 3a and 3b). The choice function was invariant against the parameter 
variations except for the strength of the negative weight between the option nodes (O_w). 
Manipulation of O_w led to a horizontal shift of the choice function and a change in steep-
ness. However, and more importantly, the inflection point of the cue validity function was 
equally shifted and remained in line with the inflection point of the choice function. The find-
ing that decision times reach a maximum at the joint inflection point of the choice and the cue 
validity function was less stable and could be replicated with a part of the parameter sets only 
(Figure 3c). There was, overall, a tendency that the maximum of decision times was shifted to 
the right with respect to the inflection point of the choice function. Furthermore, there were 
substantial changes in the shape of the function for the low decay level (D = 0.01), high cue 
links (C_w = 0.10/-0.10), and strongly negative option links (O_w = -0.60). This might be 
best explained by over-activation of nodes and might indicate that in order to derive useful 
decision time predictions, a good balance between activation and decay has to be found. 
However, decision time predictions of the PCS rule are not tested in this paper, and thus we 
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Figures 3a-c. The graphs show the result of the simulation in Figures 2a-c and the eight addi-
tional simulations with different sets of parameters for choices, subjective cue validity of cue 2 
and decision time. The decay parameter (D), the weight of the links between cues and options 
(C_w), the weight of the links between the two options (O_w) and the stability criterion for ter-
minating the consistency maximizing process (St) are manipulated.  
 
Finally, inspection of the data on a non-aggregated level showed that the raw data concerning 
choices and cue validities were quite stable, whereas there was considerable noise in the deci-
sion time predictions.  
The simulations show that a substantial decrease in the validity of the most valid cue can be 
expected if the other cues overrule this cue. Note, however, that substantial increases in the 
validity of the most valid cue would be predicted in the alternative case. Thus, aggregation 
over participants with heterogeneous choices could produce zero effects. This problem can be 
circumvented by selecting decision tasks with low differences between the cue validities (cue 
dispersion) and a high number of cues pointing against the most valid cue. According to the 
PCS rule, this should lead to more homogeneous decision behavior and, thus, should reduce 
the likelihood for zero effects. Therefore, in the experiments, decision tasks with two options 
were chosen, in which one highly valid cue made a prediction for one option, whereas three 13 
other cues pointed towards the other option. Furthermore, only relatively valid cues were cho-
sen to assure low cue dispersion.  
In the first experiment, we aimed to test whether changes in cue validities also occur for cues 
for which participants have a huge number of learning experiences, namely for prominent 
weather forecasts. Students can hardly avoid recognizing (at least occasionally) weather fore-
casts in TV channels, newspapers and the internet and they certainly cannot avoid experienc-
ing the weather on their way to university. Hence, for average German students a sufficient 
number of (at least implicit) learning trials can be expected for some of the prominent German 
weather forecasts used in the experiment.  
Experiment 1 
Participants had to decide between two places for a holiday based on weather forecasts (cues) 
from different prominent sources. The subjective validity of the cues was measured before 
and after the decision. Based on the results of the simulations, we predicted that cue validities 
are changed to form a consistent representation of the decision task. In detail, we hypothe-
sized that the subjective validity of one highly valid cue conflicting with the majority of other 
valid cues should decrease and the validity of the other cues should increase. Additionally, by 




Participants and design. Participants were 74 students (60 female, 14 male; mean age 21) 
from different majors at the University of Erfurt, who took part in a one-hour experimental 
battery and were rewarded with € 6.00. They were randomly assigned to two between-
subjects conditions in which cue values were manipulated (cue values). Each participant was 
presented with four cues (cue) which were measured before and after the decision (time). This 
resulted in a 2 (cue values) x 4 (cue) x 2 (time) mixed model design with the two latter vari-
ables being within-subject factors. 
Procedure. The experiment was entirely computer-directed and consisted of three parts. The 
complete instruction can be found in the appendix. In the first part, we measured subjective 
validities. Participants rated the validity of several well-known sources of weather forecasts 
on a horizontal scroll bar ranging from -100 (no trust at all) to +100 (trust absolutely). The 
sources, which will be called cue 1 to cue 4, were two TV stations, one newspaper, and one 
                                        
4   TTB was used as comparison standard for pragmatic reasons. Without this assumption no predictions 
concerning choices could be derived from the fast-and-frugal heuristics approach. Note, however, that all 
our conclusions concerning coherence shifts do not depend on this assumption. 14 
Internet source.
5 In the second part, lasting about 30 minutes, participants worked on a couple 
of unrelated tasks. In the third part, participants were to make decisions between two holiday 
regions A and B based on different 7-day-ahead weather forecasts. After the decision, we had 
participants rate the subjective validity of the sources of weather forecast using the same 
measure as in part 1. 
The cue values were manipulated between participants to rule out that validity changes might 
depend on effects of repeated measurement only. In condition 1, cue 2 predicted rain for re-
gion A and sun for region B and all other cues predicted the reverse pattern. In condition 2, 
cue 1 predicted rain for region A und sun for region B and all other cues predicted the reverse 
pattern. Thus, according to the PCS model, in both conditions most people should choose re-
gion B. But whereas in condition 1 the validity of cue 2 should decrease, in condition 2 a de-
crease in the validity of cue 1 was expected. At the same time, in both conditions, all other 
cue validities should increase from pre- to post-test. In contrast, TTB predicts that participants 
should choose region A or B, depending on the prediction of the most valid cue only. As men-
tioned above, fast-and-frugal heuristics in general as well as complex decision models predict 
that cue validities should be stable.  
Results 
Analysis of the choices revealed that almost all of the participants chose region B (condition 1 
= 90%, condition 2 = 100%) as predicted by the PCS rule (under the assumption that the three 
cues taken together are stronger than the one very valid but diverging cue). According to the 
cue validity rating in the pre-test, for 23 participants the cue predicting against the majority of 
cues was initially rated the most valid cue. Twenty-one of these participants (91.3%) chose 
region B although the most valid cue made a prediction for region A. For these participants it 
can be ruled out that they did apply TTB. 
A 2 (cue values) x 4 (cue) x 2 (time) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with time 
and cue as within-subjects factors and the validity ratings as dependent variables revealed sig-
nificant main effects for cue, F(2.3, 164.5) = 106.2, p < .001, η
2 = .60
6; and for time, F(1, 72) 
= 4.13, p < .05, η
2 = .05. The main effect of cue was driven by considerable differences in the 
subjective validity between cues. The differences could be attributed to systematically differ-
ent learning experiences concerning these natural cues. Means of subjective validities (with 
standard error in parentheses) for cues 1 to 4 were 53.4 (2.1), 73.6 (1.9), 27.4 (2.4), 71.9 (2.5). 
The main effect for time was caused by the higher general ratings in the post-test (Figure 4). 
                                        
5   The cues 1 to 4 were SAT1 (TV channel), ZDF (TV channel), BILD (newspaper) and “www.wetter.de.”  
6   A Greenhouse Geisser correction was used because Mauchly’s test of sphericity turned out to be signifi-
cant. The same correction was applied to all further repeated measurement analyses, if the assumption of 
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  Figure 4. The results of Experiment 1 are presented using difference scores between 
judgments of the cue validity post-test minus pre-test, positive numbers standing for an in-
crease in subjective validity judgment. Error bars represent the SE for difference scores.  
 
More interestingly and in accordance with our hypothesis, the three-way interaction of cue 
values, time and cue turned out to be highly significant, F(2.7, 194.6) = 5.0, p < .01, η
2 = .07. 
Inspection of Figure 4 shows that all changes in cue validity were in the predicted directions: 
in condition 1, the subjective validity was reduced for cue 2 and increased for all other cues, 
and in condition 2, a decrease for cue 1 and an increase for all other cues was observed. 
Discussion 
The results corroborate the assumption that cue validities are changed to form a consistent 
representation of a decision situation even for supposedly well learned real-world cues and in 
a context in which the construction of stories was impossible. Choice data provide converging 
evidence by showing that individuals did not use TTB. Choices indicate a compensatory in-
formation integration and are thus in line with the predictions of the PCS model. Hence, the 
findings provide evidence in favor of the connectionist approach to probabilistic inferences.  16 
It might have been the case, however, that cue validities were not changed during the decision 
but after the choice was made. Dissonance theory predicts that many (but not all) decisions 
cause cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1964). To achieve cognitive consistency, individuals 
tend to change the evaluation of alternatives after a decision which leads to a spreading-apart 
effect. Accordingly, the chosen alternative is rated more favorably, and the rejected alterna-
tives are rated more negatively.  
At the moment, we cannot rule out an alternative interpretation of the results in terms of post-
decisional dissonance reduction (however, see Exp. 2). Nevertheless, even such an interpreta-
tion has some important theoretical implications. As a common denominator, dissonance the-
ory and the connectionist approach share the assumption that individuals strive for consis-
tency or coherence (see also Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007). Not surprisingly, parallel con-
straint satisfaction models have been used to model dissonance reduction (Shultz & Lepper, 
1996). Most notably, the notion of cognitive consistency implies that our mind processes in-
formation in a holistic, interactive fashion. Information units mutually influence each other 
and thus cannot be considered in isolation. This view differs markedly from the fast-and-
frugal approach. If individuals apply heuristics, their decisions often should not evoke cogni-
tive dissonance because the simple strategies avoid conflict between pieces of information 
(which is a prerequisite for dissonance). Application of TTB, for example, requires only con-
sideration of one cue. If a person considers cue 2 as the cue with highest validity and the fore-
cast predicts fine weather in region A and bad weather in region B, then you can immediately 
select region A. The chosen option has only positive outcomes (fine weather) and the option 
not chosen only negative outcomes (bad weather). Under such conditions, dissonance theory 
predicts the absence of a spreading-apart effect, simply because no dissonance has arisen 
(Frey, 1981).  
Experiment 2 
To further substantiate the hypothesis that coherence shifts occur during the inference proc-
ess, we conducted a second experiment. Materials and procedures were the same as in Ex-
periment 1, with the exception that the choice measure was removed. We tested the prediction 
that people change cue validities upon perceiving and thinking about the decision situation 
even without committing themselves to a certain option (cf. Simon et al., 2001). Note that 
dissonance theory predicts the absence of dissonance reduction processes under these condi-
tions: “We must accept the fact that dissonance-reduction processes do not automatically start 
when a decision is made… The decision must have the effect of committing the person.” 
(Festinger, 1964, p. 42).    17 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-five students of the University of Erfurt (5 male, 60 female; 
mean age 20 years) participated in the experiment, which was run as part of a one-hour ex-
perimental battery. Students received € 6.00 for their participation. No between-subject ma-
nipulation was used. Cue validities of four cues were again measured in a pre- and a post-test 
resulting in a 4 (cue) x 2 (time) within-subjects design. 
Procedure. Procedure and materials were the same as in condition 1 of the previous study, 
with the exception that the actual decision was removed. First participants judged the subjec-
tive validity of the cues. After a 30-minute distraction phase they could inspect weather fore-
casts and were asked to think about a possible solution of the task. However, they were in-
structed not to make a final decision. Subsequently, participants were asked to judge the sub-
jective validity of the cues again. The exact modifications of the instruction compared to Ex-
periment 1 can again be found in the appendix.  
Results and Discussion 
A 4 (cue) x 2 (time) repeated measurement ANOVA with time and cue as within-subjects fac-
tors and the subjective cue validity as the dependent variable was used to analyze the data. 
The analysis revealed a significant interaction of cue and time, F(1.9, 123.6) = 7.5, p = .001, 
η
2 = .11. The significant main effect for cue was replicated, F(2.2, 141.5) = 67.7, p < .001, η
2 
= .51. Inspection of Figure 5 shows that the results of the present and the previous experiment 
converge. As expected, the subjective validity of cue 2 was decreased and the validity of the 
other cues was increased by merely reflecting on the decision task. Thus, the second study 
shows that shifts in validities can occur even before a decision is made. It rules out alternative 
interpretations in terms of post-decisional dissonance reduction and provides further support 
for a connectionist approach to probabilistic inferences.  





















































   Figure 5. The results of Experiment 2 are presented using the same difference scores 
as in Figure 4. Error bars represent the SE for difference scores. 
 
Against these results and in favor of the fast-and-frugal heuristics approach at least three ar-
guments might be raised. First, it might be criticized that the environment used in Experi-
ments 1 and 2 has not been shown to be an environment in which TTB should be applied 
(however, see Footnote 4). Other heuristics could have been used instead. Note, however, that 
all fast-and-frugal heuristics as well as the mentioned complex decision models predict igno-
rance of information and unidirectional reasoning from cues to options. Therefore, none of 
them can account for our findings. Second, it might be argued that our results have been ob-
served in preference decisions (i.e., which region to select for a holiday) that are based on 
probabilistic inferences (i.e., likelihood of sunshine, given certain probability cues) instead of 
pure probabilistic inferences (e.g., city-size tasks; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Glöckner 
(2006) has claimed that structural differences between probabilistic inferences and preference 
decisions (i.e., high correlation of cues vs. no correlation of attributes) are indeed likely to 
influence the selection of decision strategies. Thus, our findings should not be prematurely 
generalized, although it can be argued that many everyday problems (e.g., consumer deci-
sions) have a problem structure similar to the ones used in our experiments.  
As a third caveat, one might criticize our measurement method for the dependent variable cue 
validity. The rating of how much a person would trust information does not exactly corre-
spond with the definition of cue validity used by Gigerenzer et al. (1991). According to Gig-19 
erenzer et al. (1991), cue validity is defined by the conditional likelihood that one option is 
better on a criterion given a positive cue value [e.g., p (more sunshine | positive whether fore-
cast)]. From a Brunswikian perspective (Brunswick, 1955), our definition refers to the cue 
usage by individuals (subjective cue validity), whereas the cue validity definition by Gigeren-
zer et al. (1991) alludes to the relation between cues and decision criterion in the environment 
(objective cue validity). Gigerenzer et al. (1999) argue that over time both should converge 
because individuals learn these relations in interaction with their environment. However, re-
peatedly reported sampling errors and the mere direction of sampling are likely to produce 
substantial misrepresentation (Fiedler et al., 2000; Fiedler, 2000). Empirical data indicate that 
misrepresentations of cue validities are indeed very common and not at all rare events 
(Glöckner, 2006). To evaluate descriptive models for decision making, it is more appropriate 
to measure cue utilization than estimations of the objective cue validity (e.g., by using ratings 
of the objective cue validity). The former aim to measure influences on choices directly, 
whereas the latter are cognitive interstage products which could affect decisions but have a 
less direct influence on choices. Nevertheless, according to the finding that coherence shifts 
also change background knowledge (Simon, 2004), an effect on estimations of objective cue 
validities can be expected as well.  
We aimed to rule out the objections more fundamentally by conducting a third experiment. 
Thereby, we intended to replicate the results of Experiment 2 in city-size decision tasks which 
have been the drosophila for research on fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
In the city-size task individuals have to select the larger of two cities based on different cues 
(e.g., the city is / is not a state capital). It has been argued that individuals should apply TTB 
in such decisions because the strategy leads to very good decisions (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). Furthermore, cue validities were measured by subjective ratings of conditional likeli-




Participants and design. Sixty-three students of the University of Erfurt (8 male, 55 female; 
mean age 20.8 years) participated in the experiment, which was run as part of a 45-minute 
experimental battery. Students received € 5.00 for their participation. Four cue validities were 
measured in pre- and post-tests resulting in a 4 (cue) x 2 (time) repeated measurement design. 
Procedure. In the experiment, individuals had to think about which of two cities is larger, 
based on the following cues: the city is or is not a state capital; the city has or does not have a 
university, an international airport and/or a first league soccer team (i.e., team in the 1. 
Bundesliga). As in the previous experiment, participants did not make any decision to avoid 20 
post-decisional dissonance effects. First, the definition of cue validity based on conditional 
likelihood was explained to the participants. They were instructed to estimate the validity of 
the four cues on a scale from 0% to 100% using a horizontal scroll bar. After a filler-task of 
approximately 15 minutes, the participants were presented with structurally the same decision 
task as in the previous experiments. The most valid cue (state capital) pointed against all 
lower cues. Participants should imagine participating in a quiz show where they have to de-
cide which of two cities is larger without exact knowledge about the cities’ populations. They 
were told that city A is a state capital but has no university, no international airport, and no 
first league soccer team, whereas city B is no state capital but has a university, an interna-
tional airport, and a soccer team in the highest league. Participants were instructed not to 
make a decision yet, because the quizmaster would soon provide additional important infor-
mation, but that they should try to understand the information set. Then the cue validity was 
measured using the same method as in the pre-test. Afterwards participants were informed 
that the quizmaster was not allowed to give the additional information, and that they had to 
decide without it. Finally, confidence in the decision was measured using a horizontal scroll 
bar ranging from -100 (very unconfident) to +100 (very confident). The complete instruction 
is provided in the appendix. 
Results and Discussion   
Exploratory analyses revealed that three participants repeatedly produced extreme outliers 
(+/- 3 SD) for the difference between cue validity ratings from pre- to post-test. These three 
persons were excluded from the analysis. Again, a repeated measurement ANOVA with time 
and cue as within-subjects factors and subjective cue validity as the dependent variable was 
computed to analyze the data. It indicated a significant interaction of cue and time, F(2.7, 
158.3) = 3.1, p = .03, η
2 = .05. In line with the predictions of the PCS rule and the findings of 
experiments 1 and 2, the presentation of the decision task systematically influenced the cue 
validity ratings (Figure 6). The validity of the highly valid cue state capital was substantially 
decreased. In contrast to the previously reported studies we did not find a substantial increase 

















































Figure 6. The results of Experiment 2 are presented using the same difference scores as in 
Figure 4. Error bars represent the SE for difference scores. 
 
 
A significant main effect for cue was found, F(2.7, 158.6) = 27.3, p < .001, η
2 = .32. The av-
erage confidence ratings for the cues international airport, state capital, university, and soccer 
team (with SE in parentheses) were 74.6 (2.85), 73.7 (2.54), 59.1 (2.59), and 48.5 (3.18). As 
intended by the selection of the cues, state capital was considered the most valid cue in the 
pre-test. In the post-test, however, the international airport was considered the most valid cue 
indicating that consistency maximizing processes do not only account for minor changes of 
validity ratings but can even lead to alterations in the ordinal cue hierarchy. 
Analyses of the choices showed that the large majority of participants selected city B (76.7%) 
against the prediction of the initially most valid cue (i.e., state capital) and that only a minor-
ity selected city A (23.3%). This again provides converging evidence against the application 
of TTB.  
Confidence judgments were analyzed by computing correlations between confidence and a 
weighted additive difference (WADD-DIFF) score which indicates the difference between the 
weighted evidence for the options. The WADD-DIFF score was calculated by subtracting the 
weighted sum of the total evidence for city B from the weighted total evidence for city A and 
taking the absolute value of the result. High (low) values indicate large (small) advantages of 
one city over the other. Two separate WADD-DIFF scores were computed based on the cue 
validity estimations in the pre- and the post-test respectively. For both WADD-DIFF scores 22 
correlation coefficients were computed with the confidence judgment after the decision. Ac-
cording to the PCS rule (and other weighted compensatory models) it is expected that confi-
dence should increase with increasing WADD-DIFF scores. For the pre-test scores, there was 
no significant correlation (r = -.11, p > .05), but for the post-test scores a highly significant 
correlation was found (r = .63, p < .001). In line with the predictions of the PCS rule, confi-
dence decreases with increasing difference between the (weighted) evidence in favor of each 
city in the post-test scores. Remember that the consistency maximizing processes are assumed 
to accentuate the advantage of the favored option when perceiving the decision task. Confi-
dence judgments are based on the posterior perception of the decision after coherence shifts 
occurred (i.e., the posterior cue validities). Thus, it lends additional support for the PCS rule 
that only the posterior WADD-DIFF score are correlated with confidence.  
General Discussion 
We studied the stability of cue validities during simple decisions based on probabilistic infer-
ences. From the PCS approach we derived the assumption that cue validities are changed dur-
ing the decision process to form a consistent representation of the decision situation. Findings 
from the three experiments using a within-subjects design strongly corroborate this hypothe-
sis. The first two experiments show that such changes are observed in environments for which 
comprehensive learning experiences can be expected. The third experiment indicates that 
these coherence shifts also occur in environments for which is has been claimed that fast-and-
frugal heuristics are applied. All three experiments illustrate that coherence shifts are not lim-
ited to contexts in which stories about the situation can be constructed. It was furthermore 
demonstrated that coherence shifts can be found for cue validity ratings based on direct esti-
mations of cue usage as well as for estimations of conditional likelihoods. 
The second and third experiment indicate that coherence shifts are initiated before a decision 
is made. Thus, shifts in validities cannot be attributed to post-decisional reduction of disso-
nance (Festinger, 1964; see also Simon & Holyoak, 2002). The findings converge with those 
obtained in recent studies on multi-attribute choice and legal decision making (e.g., Simon et 
al., 2004; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004; Simon, 2004). They add into an accumulating body of 
evidence supporting the validity of a connectionist approach to judgment and decision making 
(Glöckner, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Glöckner & Betsch, in press; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; 
Simon et al., 2004; Thagard & Millgram, 1995). The evidence is in line with findings from 
other recent studies on probabilistic inference decisions that show that the PCS rule predicts 
choices, decision times and confidence ratings generally better than fast-and-frugal heuristics 
and complex decision models (Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner & Betsch, in press; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008; but see Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007). 
Our results challenge the notion of unidirectional decision making – one of the implicit as-
sumptions of most decision models discussed for probabilistic inferences. Fast-and-frugal 23 
heuristics and most complex decision models involve a unidirectional decision process start-
ing from the information as a given parameter and inferring the criterion from it. Processes of 
restructuring of cues are not part of both kinds of strategies. Our findings, however, suggest 
that individuals take the entire set of information into account and actively change predictors 
to form a consistent representation of the decision situation. As such, probabilistic inferences 
seem to involve holistic, bidirectional processes. 
Against the background of the influential bounded rationality argument (Simon, 1955), the 
question arises how the mind can perform such complex computations that take even modern 
computers several seconds to solve. With the PCS model we suggest that people use auto-
matic processes that have been evolutionarily evolved from more basic processes of percep-
tion. Not incidentally, the proposed PCS model (like most other current parallel constraint 
models) was developed on the basic algorithm proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) 
to account for word perception. As Maule (2005) pointed out, a central theme in future re-
search on decision making will be the question of how individuals perceive and represent the 
given information in decision situations. Our research puts forward that the automatic system 
does a great deal of work in restructuring given information. Hence, the fundamental argu-
ment of Herbert Simon (1955, 1982) stating that people do not have the cognitive capacity to 
perform complex computations has to be qualified by adding “serially and deliberately.” 
However, reading Simon closely reveals that he already anticipated this possibility:  
My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of evidence that, in actual 
choice situations of any complexity, these [EU] computations can be, or are in fact, per-
formed... but we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better de-
cision-maker than the conscious.  
(Herbert Simon, 1955, p.104) 
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References 
Bergert, F. B., & Nosofsky, R. M. (2007). A response-time approach to comparing General-
ized Rational and Take-the-Best models of decision making. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(1), 107-129.  
Betsch, T., Haberstroh, S., Glockner, A., Haar, T., & Fiedler, K. (2001). The effects of routine 
strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84(1), 23-53. 
Betsch, T. (2005). Preference theory: An affect-based approach to recurrent decision making. 
In T. Betsch & S. Haberstroh (Eds.), The routines of decision making. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Bröder, A. (2000). Assessing the empirical validity of the “take-the-best” heuristic as a model 
of human probabilistic inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Mem-
ory, and Cognition, 26, 1332-1346.  
Bröder, A. (2003). Decision making with the “Adaptive Toolbox”: Influence of environ-
mental structure, intelligence, and working memory load. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 611-625. 
Bröder, A., & Gaissmaier, W. (2007). Sequential processing of cues in memory-based mul-
tiattribute decisions. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 895-900. 
Brownstein, A. L. (2003). Biased predecision processing. Psychological Bulletin, 129(4), 
545-568. 
Brownstein, A. L., Read, S. J., & Simon, D. (2004). Bias at the racetrack: Effects of individ-
ual expertise and task importance on predecision reevaluation of alternatives. Personal-
ity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(7), 891-904.Brunswik, E. (1955). Representative 
design and the probability theory in a functional psychology. Psychological Review, 62, 
193-217. 
Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision field theory: A dynamic cognitive ap-
proach to decision making in an uncertain environment. Psychological Review, 100, 
432-459. 
Busemeyer, J. R., & Johnson, J. G. (2004). Computational models of decision making. In D. 
Koehler and N. Harvey (Eds.), Handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 133-
154). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Carlson, K. A., & Russo, J. E. (2001). Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7(2), 91-103. 25 
Czerlinski, J., Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999). How good are simple heuristics? In 
G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, & the ABC Research Group, Simple heuristics that make us 
smart (pp. 97-118). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Dougherty, M. R. P., Gettys, C. F., & Ogden, E. E. (1999). MINERVA-DM: A memory proc-
ess model for judgments of likelihood. Psychological Review, 106, 108-209. 
Egan, L. C., Santos, L. R., & Bloom, P. (2007). The origins of cognitive dissonance: Evidence 
from children and monkeys. Psychological Science, 18(11), 978-983.  
Festinger, L. (1964). Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judg-
ment biases. Psychological Review, 107(4), 659-676. 
Fiedler, K., Brinkmann, B., Betsch, T., & Wild, B. (2000). A sampling approach to biases in 
conditional probability judgments: Beyond base rate neglect and statistical format. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(3), 399-418. 
Frey, D. (1981). Informationssuche und Informationsbewertung bei Entscheidungen [Infor-
mation search and evaluation in decision making]. Bern: Huber. 
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental models: A 
Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review, 98, 506-528. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of 
bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650-669. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & the ABC Group (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999). Betting on one good reason: The take the best 
heuristic. In G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, & the ABC Research Group, Simple heuristics 
that make us smart (pp. 75-95). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and frugal heuristics: The tools of bounded rationality. In: D. 
Koehler, & N. Harvey (Eds.), Handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 62-88). 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Gilbert, D. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107-119. 
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (Eds.) (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychol-
ogy of intuitive judgment. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.   26 
Glöckner, A. (2006). Automatische Prozesse bei Entscheidungen [Automatic processes in 
decision making]. Hamburg: Kovac.   
Glöckner, A. (2007a). Does intuition beat fast and frugal heuristics? A systematic empirical 
analysis. In H. Plessner, C. Betsch & T. Betsch (Eds.), Intuition in judgment and deci-
sion making (pp. 309–325). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Glöckner, A. (2007b, August). Solving complex legal cases using the intuitive system. Paper 
presented at the Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making, Warsaw, Poland. 
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008). Modeling option and strategy choices with connectionist 
networks: Towards an integrative model of automatic and deliberate decision making. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 3(3), 215–228. 
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (in press). Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic 
processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 
Holyoak, K.J., & Simon, D. (1999). Bidirectional reasoning in decision making by constraint 
satisfaction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 3-31.  
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.) (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and biases. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and 
biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49-81). New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Maule, J. (2005). Re-Framing decision framing. Presidential address at the 20th Biennial 
Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making, August 22-24, 
Stockholm, Sweden. 
McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981). An interactive model of context effects in letter 
perception. Part 1. An account of basic findings. Psychological Review, 88, 375-407. 
Montgomery, H. (1989). From cognition to action: The search for dominance in decision 
making.  In H. Montgomery & O. Svenson (Eds.), Process and structure in human deci-
sion making (pp. 23-49). New York: Wiley. 
Newell, B. R., Weston, N. J., & Shanks, D. R. (2003). Empirical test of fast-and-frugal heuris-
tic: not everyone “takes-the-best”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Proc-
esses, 91, 82-96. 27 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988). Adaptive strategy selection in decision 
making.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 14, 
534-552. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1992). Behavioral decision research: A con-
structive processing perspective. Annual Review Psychology, 43, 87-131. 
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992). Explaining the evidence: Tests of the Story Model for 
juror decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(2), 189-206.  
Read, S. J., Vanman, E. J., & Miller, L. C. (1997). Connectionism, parallel constraint satisfac-
tion and gestalt principles: (Re)introducting cognitive dynamics to social psychology. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 26-53. 
Read, S. J. & Miller, L. C. (1998). On the dynamic construction of meaning: An interactive 
activation and competition model of social perception. In S. J. Read & L. C. Miller 
(Eds.),  Connectionist models of social reasoning and social behavior (pp. 27-70), 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Rieskamp, J., & Otto, P. E. (2006). SSL: A Theory of How People Learn to Select Strategies. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135(2), 207-236. 
Russo, J. E., Meloy, M. G., & Medvec, V. H. (1998). Predecisional distortion of product in-
formation. Journal of Marketing Research, 35(4), 438-452. 
Shultz, T. R., & Lepper, M. R. (1996). Cognitive dissonance reduction as constraint satisfac-
tion. Psychological Review, 103, 219-240. 
Simon, D., & Holyoak, K. J. (2002). Structural dynamics of cognition: from consistency the-
ory to constraint satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 283-294. 
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., & Holyoak, K. J. (2004). Construction of preferences by con-
straint satisfaction. Psychological Science, 15, 331-336.  
Simon, D. (2004). A third view of the black box: cognitive coherence in legal decision mak-
ing. University of Chicago Law Review, 71, 511-586.  
Simon, D., Snow, C. J., & Read, S. J. (2004). The redux of cognitive consistency theories: 
evidence judgments by constraint satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 86, 814-837. 
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., Bleicher, A., & Holyoak, K. J. (in press). The Transience of 
Constructed Preferences. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 28 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 69, 99-118.  
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preference. American Psychologist, 50, 364-371. 
Svenson, O. (1992). Differentiation and consolidation theory of human decision making: A 
frame of reference for the study of pre- and post-decision processes. Acta Psychologica, 
80, 143-168. 
Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(3), 435-502. 
Thagard, P. & Millgram, E. (1995). Inference to the best plan: A coherence theory of deci-
sion. In A. Ram & D. B. Leake (Eds.), Goal-driven learning (pp. 439-454). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Thagard, P. (2003). Why wasn't O.J. convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference. Cog-
nition & Emotion, 17(3), 361-383. 
Usher, M., & McClelland, J. L. (2001). The time course of perceptual choice: The leaky, 
competing accumulator model. Psychological Review, 108(3), 550-592. 
Usher, M., & McClelland, J. L. (2004). Loss Aversion and Inhibition in Dynamical Models of 
Multialternative Choice. Psychological Review, 111(3), 757-769. 
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Weber, E. U., Goldstein, W. M., & Barlas, S. (1995). And let us not forget memory: The role 
of memory processes and techniques in the study of judgment and choice.  In J. R. 
Busemeyer, R. Hastie, & D. L. Medin (Eds.), Decision making from a perspective of 
cognitive psychology (pp. 38 - 81). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 29 
Appendix 
Instructions Experiment 1 [Originally instructions were in German] 
Pre-Test / Post-Test 
For the following questions, please try to make as accurate judgments as possible. 
Please estimate how much you would trust the pieces of information for predicting the 
weather in a holiday destination 7 days from now. Please try to provide as accurate ratings as 
possible.  
Weather forecast of SAT1 
Weather forecast of ZDF 
Weather forecast of the Bild Zeitung 
Weather forecast in the internet at www.wetter.de 
Presentation of the decision situation 
Please read the description of the situation and make a decision! 
Please imagine you are planning a holiday and you consider the places A and B. It is very im-
portant for you that the sun is shining during your holiday. Therefore, you extensively collect 
information of different weather forecasts.  The holiday starts in 7 days and today is the last 
possibility to book a holiday flat. The flats which are offered in places A and B are of equal 
standard from your perspective. However, the places are far away from each other and the 
weather could be different in the two places.  
The following information is available to you: 
The SAT1 weather forecast predicts rain for place A and sunshine for place B. 
You see that the ZDF weather forecast predicts sunshine for place A and rain for place B. 
You buy a Bild newspaper and find the following predictions: sunshine in place A, 
rain in place B. 
In the internet you find at www.wetter.de the forecast that there will be sun in place A 
and rain in place B. 
Which holiday flat would you book?                         Place A                        Place B 
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Modifications to Instructions Experiment 2 
Presentation of the decision situation 
Please read the description of the situation thoroughly! 
[Middle part equivalent to Experiment 1] 
Please take the time to reflect for which place you would decide, based on the available in-
formation!                                                           Ready  
Instructions Experiment 3 
In the following study you should estimate how much information a certain attribute provides 
for the number of inhabitants of a city. Please try to make accurate and differentiated judg-
ments. 
Pre-Test / Post-Test 
The predictive power of an attribute for the size of a city is called VALIDITY. The validity of 
an attribute is defined as the likelihood that a city which has this attribute is larger than a city 
that does not have the attribute.  Such an attribute could be that a city has or does not have a 
cathedral. A city with a cathedral will tend to be larger than a city without a cathedral. The 
validity of the attribute (i.e., the likelihood that a city with a cathedral is larger than a city 
without a cathedral) will be larger than 50%. Please estimate the validity of 4 attributes. [page 
break]  
Please estimate as accurately and differentiated as possible the validity (predictive power) of 
the following properties for the population of German cities with more than 100.000 inhabi-
tants. Reminder: The validity of an attribute is defined as the likelihood that a city with the 
attribute is larger than a city without the attribute. 
Presentation of the decision situation 
Please imagine you have reached the 1-million-dollar question in a quiz show. The question 
is: Which city has more inhabitants: city A or city B? Unfortunately, you do not know the 
exact population numbers. You know that A and B are German cities with more than 100.000 
inhabitants. Furthermore you remember the following attributes:  
City A is a state capital      City B is no state capital 
City A has no university      City B has a university 
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City A has no international airport    City B has an international airport 
City A has no first league soccer team  City B has a first league soccer team 
Please do not decide yet because the quiz master has indicated that he will provide important 
additional advice. Try to understand the information set as well as possible. 
  